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Abstract
Jamming is the act of intentionally directing a disturbing
electromagnetic wave towards a communication system
in order to disrupt or prevent signal reception. Jamming
is becoming a serious threat for several services includ-
ing Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) where it
is used to prevent the computation of the user position.
This paper describes the joint efforts of the European
Commission (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) and of
the Faculty of Maritime Studies and Transport of the Uni-
versity of Ljubljana to experimentally evaluate the GNSS
jamming threat. In particular several experiments have
been conducted in order to build a library of scenarios
for the evaluation of jamming detection and mitigation
techniques. Data containing jamming signals have been
collected in the JRC anechoic chamber and different ap-
proaches have been compared for the detection of jam-
ming signals. The analysis shows a good coherence among
the different detection metrics considered.
1 Introduction
Good performance and ease of operations make Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-based navigation widely
used in several applications and in different fields such as
avionic, Location Based Service (LBS) and road trans-
portation. Several infrastructures rely on GNSS-based
positioning, hence GNSS should provide reliable and con-
tinuous services.
GNSS receivers are able to compute their Position Veloc-
ity and Time (PVT) solution using the trilateration tech-
nique and exploiting the signals transmitted by different
satellites. The distance between receiver and satellite an-
tennas is usually in the order of 20000 km, hence the
received signals are very weak and they are vulnerable
to different sources of interference. Such interference
can be natural, such as that due to atmospheric effects,
or malicious such as spoofing and jamming attacks [1].
GNSS threats, such as spoofing and jamming, are attract-
ing increasing interest among the navigation community
and several studies have been carried out in order to de-
tect and mitigate GNSS threats. In particular, consider-
able efforts from the research community have been in-
vested to investigate the impact of jammers [2]. From
the studies conducted, it emerges that GNSS jammers
can interfere with GNSS signals over wide geographical
areas. GNSS jammers can significantly effect on GPS
and Galileo receivers which can be however protected us-
ing several countermeasures such as adaptive notch filters
[3].
In this paper, the joint efforts of the European Commis-
sion (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) and of Faculty
of Maritime Studies and Transport of the University of
Ljubljana are described. The experiments conducted have
the goal to experimentally evaluate the GNSS jamming
threat. In particular, several tests have been conducted in
order to build a library of scenarios for the evaluation of
jamming detection and mitigation techniques. Data con-
taining jamming signals have been collected in the JRC
anechoic chamber. The tests have been carried out in dif-
ferent scenarios including static and kinematic jammer
with and without attenuation. Moreover, different ap-
proaches have been compared for the detection of jam-
ming signals. The analysis shows the advantages and
drawbacks of the different techniques considered. A sec-
ond series of tests have been conducted in the Slovenian
countryside including vehicular tests. The analysis of the
data collected will be presented in a separate publication.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2 the measurement unit adopted for the data col-
lection is described. In Section 3 the experimental setup
is shown, then the experimental results are analyzed in
Section 4. Finally Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data Collection System
The measurement unit adopted for the reception of GNSS
and jamming signals was made of a Realtek RTL2832U
front-end and a ublox LEA-6T receiver connected to the
same GPS patch antenna. A schematic representation of
the measurement unit used for data collections is shown
in Fig. 1. The Realtek RTL2832U device was config-
ured to operate according to the settings reported in Ta-
ble 1 and it was adopted to collect raw In-phase/Quadra-
phase (I/Q) GPS and jamming signals. A custom soft-
ware, the JRC Interference Monitor (JIM), was developed
and interfaced to the Realtek RTL2832U device to col-
lect I/Q samples and monitor the histogram and Power
Spectral Density (PSD) of the data. The ublox LEA-6T
receiver was adopted to collect raw GPS measurements
such as pseudoranges, Doppler shifts, carrier phases and
Carrier-to-Noise power spectral density ratio (C/N0) val-
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Figure 1: Measurement unit used for the data collection.
a) Photo of the instrumented cart used in the anechoic
chamber. b) Schematic representation of the data collec-
tion unit.
Table 1: Settings adopted for the Realtek RTL2832U de-
vice used as a GNSS data grabber.
Parameter Value
Sampling frequency fs = 2.048 MHz
Centre frequency 1575.42 MHz
Sampling Type Complex I/Q
No. of bits 8
ues. Moreover, the ublox receiver provides several met-
rics related to the receiver status such as the Automatic
Gain Control (AGC) count. These metrics can be used for
jamming detection. The Realtek RTL2832U device and
ublox LEA-6T receiver were directly powered through
the USB ports of the laptop and no additional power sup-
ply was required. Fig. 1 shows a view of the instrumented
cart equipped with the Realtek RTL2832U device and the
ublox LEA-6T receiver.
3 Experimental Setup
Several experiments were conducted in order to build a
library of scenarios for jamming detection. The first set
of experiments was conducted inside the anechoic cham-
ber of the JRC. The anechoic chamber is equipped with
a Spirent 9000 GNSS simulator. Moreover, it is possi-
ble to rebroadcast inside the chamber live GNSS signals
collected by a wideband antenna mounted on roof of the
building hosting the chamber.
A schematic representation of the experimental setup
prepared inside the JRC anechoic chamber is provided
in Fig. 2. The floor and the walls of the chamber are
covered by Radio Frequency (RF) absorbers which con-
fine electromagnetic signals inside the chamber. For the
experiments, a pedestrian path was prepared by remov-
ing some absorbing units from the floor and data record-
ing/detection units were installed in the bottom left cor-
ner of the chamber as highlighted in Fig. 2. By walking
along the pedestrian path, a user carrying a jammer was
able to simulate different distances between the detection
units and the jamming device. It is noted that the diameter
of the chamber is 20 meters and thus its was possible to
introduce significant changes in the distance between the
jammer and the detection units. Moreover, the chamber is
equipped with a central cylinder which is generally used
to hold cars and other devices to be characterized from an
Central 
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detection 
units 
Jammer 
Pedestrian  
path 
GPS/GNSS signals  
rebroadcast from  
the roof 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the experimental
setup prepared inside the JRC anechoic chamber. Dif-
ferent tests were conducted with the jammer static in the
right bottom corner of the chamber or carried by a pedes-
trian user moving along the pedestrian path.
Victim 
receivers/ 
Front-ends 
Figure 3: View of the experimental setup used for the
anechoic chamber tests.
electromagnetic standpoint. For the experiments, it was
decided to leave the central cylinder in order to introduce
obstacles between the recording/detection units and the
jammer. In this way, different reception conditions were
simulated. Finally, power attenuators were used to reduce
the power transmitted by the jammer.
In addition to the experiments involving a pedestrian user,
a second set of tests were performed with a static jammer.
The jammer was left in the bottom right corner of the
chamber. A programmable attenuator was used to vary
the power transmitted by the jammer. In this case, the dis-
tance between the recording/detection units and the jam-
mer was 11.78 metres. A view of the experimental setup
used for the anechoic chamber tests is provided in Fig. 3.
4 Experimental Analysis
In this section, the results obtained using different mea-
surement units adopted for the reception of GNSS and
jamming signals, specifically the Realtek RTL2832U front-
end and the ublox LEA-6T GPS receiver, are analysed.
The devices provide different types of measurements which
can be used to demonstrate different techniques for jam-
ming detection.
As a first step, the data collected using the Realtek RTL2832U
front-end are analysed. The metrics computed using the
I/Q data from the front-end can be divided in direct and
derived metrics. Examples of direct metrics are the time-
varying histogram and the time-varying PSD. Metrics de-
rived from the histogram are the mean, variance and kur-
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a) b)
Figure 4: a) Time evolution of the histograms of the sam-
ples collected using the RTL2832U receiver. b) Time
evolution of the PSDs of the samples collected using the
RTL2832U receiver. Battery-powered jammer test.
tosis whereas metrics derived from the PSD are the total
power and the PSD entropy.
Although several tests were conducted, a single experi-
ment is presented here due to space limitations. The total
duration of the test was of almost 4 minutes. In the first
part of the test the jammer position was fixed and the jam-
ming power was attenuated using a 30 dB attenuator. The
user then started to move along the path described in Fig.
3. The first part of the test was concluded by turning off
the jammer and removing the attenuator. The second part
of the test was performed similarly to the first one but
without attenuating the jammer power. In Fig. 4 a), the
time evolution of the histogram of the samples collected
is shown. During the initial phase of the test (5 sec), when
the jammer was off, the samples follow a Gaussian dis-
tribution. When the jammer was turned on and the user
started to walk along the path described in Fig. 3, the dis-
tribution of the samples started to change; in particular
when the user reached the minimum distance from the
receiving equipment, the maximum deviation from the
Gaussian distribution appeared in the histogram. Specifi-
cally, a saturation of the device can be noted: this appears
as the concentration of the samples in the tails of the his-
tograms. When the jammer was turned off, the sample
distribution came back to Gaussian. In the second phase
(i.e., without attenuation) of the test the impact of the
jammer clearly emerges, and is even more evident than in
the previous case. This is due to the higher power trans-
mitted by the jammer. In Fig. 4 b), the time evolution of
the PSDs of the samples collected using the RTL2832U
receiver is shown. The analysis of the PSD evolution pro-
vides similar findings to that obtained from the histogram
analysis. At the beginning of the test, almost no power
can be detected at the different frequencies. When the
jammer was turned on and the user stared to move, the
presence of the jammer can be clearly identified, in both
phases of the test (i.e., without and with attenuation).
In Fig. 5, the derived metrics are plotted as a function
of time. Specifically, the mean (in the upper box), the
variance (in the central box) and excess kurtosis (in the
lower box) are represented. From the analysis of the
mean, it can be noted that when the jammer was acti-
vated a high frequency noise is present, this phenomena
is more evident when the user is closer to the receiving
device and when the attenuator is removed as highlighted
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Figure 5: The derived metrics are plotted as a function
of the time. Specifically the mean (in the upper box) the
variance (in the central box) and Kurtosis (in the lower
box) are represented as a function of time.
in the grey boxes. From the central box, it can be noted
that the variance of the samples increases when the jam-
mer was activated, in particular a ramp can be appreciated
when the user was moving towards the receiver device.
In the second part of the test, such behaviour is not de-
tected because of the removal of the attenuator and of the
limited walking distance available in the anechoic cham-
ber. However it is possible to identify the passages of the
user behind the central pillar which strongly attenuates
the jammer power. Also from the lower box of Fig. 5,
where the kurtosis is plotted as a function of the time, it
is possible to identify the presence of jamming effects.
When the jammer is turned on, the parameter is higher
than in the other case. Also in this case it is possible to
identify the shielding effect of the central pillar.
In Fig. 6 the received power (upper box) and entropy
(lower box) are plotted as a function of time. From the
upper box, the presence of the jammer and the user mov-
ing can be clearly identified; the power grew when the
jammer was turned on and a ramp can be identified due
to the approaching of the jammer to the receiver. Also
in this case the presence of the central cylinder can be
noted. From the lower box, the activation of the jammer
is clearly indicated by the entropy behaviour. Also in this
case the results are consistent with that obtained from the
other metrics used for the jamming detection.
The ublox receiver does not provide I/Q samples and
alternative metrics have been used for jamming detec-
tion. Specifically, the authors used the C/N0 measure-
ments provided by the device. The C/N0 of the signals
received by the ublox receiver are plotted as a function
of time in Fig. 7. From the figure, the impact of the
jammer on the C/N0 measurements clearly emerges; in
the first part of the test (with the 30 dB attenuation), a
slight reduction of the C/N0 values can be noted when
the jammer was turned on. When the user started moving
towards the receiver all the C/N0 values were reduced
reaching the minimum value when the user, with the jam-
mer, approached the receiver. In the second phase of the
test (without attenuation) the jammer effect is more ev-
ident. In this case, it is not possible to identify the ap-
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Figure 6: Received power (upper box) and entropy (lower
box) computed using the PSD of the samples collected
using the RTL2832U receiver, as a function of time.
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Figure 7: C/N0 of the signals received by the ublox re-
ceiver as a function of time.
proaching movement of the jammer to the receiver, be-
cause the C/N0 values fell down drastically but it is pos-
sible to identify the shielding effect of the pillar. As in the
previous case, two derived metrics, exploiting the C/N0
measurements, have been analysed. In Fig. 8, the Sum
of Square (SoS) detector (upper box) [4] and the aver-
age C/N0 have been plotted as a function of time. Al-
though no information related to the movement of the
jammer can be obtained, the SoS decision metric was able
to identify the activation and de-activation of the jammer,
exploiting the correlation on the C/N0s introduced by
the jammer; also the presence of the pillar can be noted.
From the lower box, it clearly emerges that when the jam-
mer was activated, the average C/N0 decreases and the
approaching movement of the user can be identified. In
the second part of the test, the impact of the jammer is
more evident and the presence of the central cylinder can
be identified. The cylinder limits the jammer power and
the observations on the C/N0 are coherent with the re-
sults of the other metrics.
5 Conclusion
In order to evaluate the jammer impact, several experi-
ments have been conducted using a Realtek RTL2832U
front-end and a ublox LEA-6T receiver connected to the
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Figure 8: SoS decision metric (upper box) and average
C/N0 as a function of time.
same GPS patch antenna and different types of jammers.
Several tests have been carried out in order to build a li-
brary of scenarios for the evaluation of jamming detection
and mitigation techniques. The test were performed in
the JRC anechoic chamber, using different types of jam-
mers in different configurations including static and kine-
matic jamming attacks. In addition, different approaches
for jamming detection have been implemented exploiting
the measurements provided by the two above mentioned
receivers. The performance of the algorithms has been
compared and the analysis shows that a user equipped
with one of the device can clearly identify a jamming at-
tack. The use of different metrics allows one to obtain
different types of information such as the approaching of
a kinematic jammer or the presence of obstacles in the
jamming path which can mitigate the jamming effects.
The results show that even a mass-market receiver can
detect a jamming attack exploiting the SoS decision or
the average C/N0.
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